International Lawyer
Volume 14

Number 3

Article 10

1980

Legal Counseling in the Middle East: Particular Lessons from Iran
Gail Frey Borden

Recommended Citation
Gail Frey Borden, Legal Counseling in the Middle East: Particular Lessons from Iran, 14 INT'L L. 545 (1980)
https://scholar.smu.edu/til/vol14/iss3/10

This Current Developments is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has
been accepted for inclusion in International Lawyer by an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more
information, please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.

GAIL FREY BORDEN*

Legal Counseling in the

Middle East:
Particular Lessons from Iran
1. Introduction
The complicity of Iranian authorities in the taking of American citizens
and diplomats hostage in the American embassy in Tehran and the reaction
of the United States have brought what little American commerce existed
with. Iran between the fall of 1978 and October 1979 to a virtual end.
This sudden, dramatic, and for American business in particular, disastrous
end of the era of large deals and high profits in Iran affords an opportunity to
examine how legal counseling was rendered with respect to doing business in
that country in the 1970s and apply the lessons learned there to other countries in the Middle East that may suffer the political and economic difficulties
Iran is now experiencing.
The course of foreign business activity in Iran during the years from 1974
to the present can be conveniently divided into five periods, characterized
respectively by euphoria, doubt, dismay, confusion and, finally certainty
that commercial relations with Iran will, if they resume at all, never be the
same as they were before January 1978. These five periods were:
1. The period from January, 1974 to the beginning of 1976, when foreign
businesses became euphoric with the opportunities to recycle Iranian petrodollars and exerted themselves to acquire contracts to perform work in, or
for, Iran to form joint ventures; license technology; provide technical assistance; and to become part of the economic miracle that the Shah asserted
would very shortly make Iran the industrial equal of West Germany.
2. The period from the beginning of 1976 to the beginning of 1978, when a
sense of doubt began to arise about the advisability of many of the grandiose
projects underway and the practicality of the Shah's thrust to modernize at
such a hectic pace.
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3. The period from the beginning of 1978 to the fall of that year, when
foreign companies watched with fascination and dismay as the political opposition to the Shah mounted and the possibility of conducting business in an
orderly fashion grew more and more remote as the numbers of marchers
against the regime increased.
4. The period from the fall of 1978 to November 1979 in which foreign
businesses attempted to determine what they should do with respect to their
suspended operations in Iran.
5. The period from November 1979 to the present, in which it has become
a certainty that commerce between the United States and Iran will remain
suspended for the foreseeable future, and that the commercial and legal
problems that have arisen from the revolution in Iran will be worked out by
litigation in courts outside Iran.
Thus there has occurred in little more than six years a kaleidoscopic series
of alterations in the risks of doing business in Iran. The most pertinent question about these rapid alterations of risk is whether lessons may be learned
from what happened there that can be applied to dealings in other countries
in the Middle East which are of a political, social and economic volatility
similar to that of Iran. For the rapid changes that have occurred in Iran
should not be considered particular to Iran; the recent history of the Middle
East provides other examples of "stable" governments and economies that
have slipped into chaos; and the future will no doubt reveal other instances in
which Middle Eastern nations falter politically and economically as severely,
although one may hope not as suddenly, as did Iran.
General and specific lessons applicable to the transaction of business in the
rest of the Middle East may be drawn from the course of foreign business
activity and legal counselling in Iran. This paper focuses only upon some of
the specific lessons that arise with respect to the following types of contract
clauses:
A. Parties
The local party or parties to a contract in a Middle Eastern country should
be carefully chosen; for their status, capabilities and financial soundness will
affect the operation and the enforcement of the terms of the contract to the
greatest degree. The parties to such a contract will be the foreign and local
entities; the latter being either the local government (or one of its agencies)
and/or an individual or legal entity in the local private sector.
1. THE FOREIGN PARTY
In structuring a transaction to be carried out in the Middle East it is more
often the case than not that counsel to a foreign client gives too little thought
to the identity of the legal entity that should enter into the contract on behalf
of the foreign client. The principal considerations in selecting an entity to be
involved in the transaction will be the degree to which tax benefits will flow
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from the use of that entity, and the amount of protection against liability
which use of that entity will afford.
Counsel often overlooks the fact that if his client enters directly into contract with a local party, without the intervention of a legal subsidiary of the
client, the client's assets could be reached by the local party in the event of a
dispute being resolved in favor of the local party. In Iran, failure to create a
discrete legal entity to enter into a particular contract resulted, even before
the political chaos of the last two years, in situations in which the potential
liabilities of foreign companies to parties in Iran were far in excess of the
profit they had earned there. And in the present situation in which disputes
are more likely to be resolved in the courts of the United States than in the
courts of Iran, counsel should be aware that substantial counterclaims will
doubtless be made against plaintiffs which will, if sustained, presumably be
satisfied out of the parent company's assets if no intervening legal entity
exists.
Counsel should also note that foreign companies often enter into more
than one transaction with a local party, failing to perceive that their income
from one transaction is subject to levy in the event that the second transaction
to which they are party results in a dispute being settled against the foreign
party. Thus counsel should very carefully consider whether any benefit is
gained from including more than one transaction under the same legal umbrella; or whether it is wiser to ensure that all transactions are separated
carefully from one another by the use of different legal vehicles in each separate transaction.
With respect to taxation, foreign companies should have been aware in
Iran, and should be similarly concerned in other parts of the Middle East,
that performance of more than one contract by the same legal entity may very
well result in aggregation of the incomes of that company from the different
transactions for the purposes of taxation, which could shift the company into
a very much higher tax bracket than would be the case were different legal
entities employed to carry out different transactions.
2. THE LOCAL PARTY
a. Local Government
In all Middle Eastern countries the local government is a direct participant
in the economy. Consequently, governments themselves as well as their
ministries and agencies enter into agreements of many different types. Counsel rarely appears to consider the specialized problems involved in contracting with a government. Many clients are now unclear about their abilities
effectively to pursue their rights with respect to claims against the government of Iran. Note in this connection that the same concerns should be considered with respect to other countries in the Middle East, which could experience the kind of upheaval suffered in Iran; and contract documents should
be reviewed to determine whether difficulties might arise in the future which
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had not been perceived when the contracts were closed, but which have been
emphasized by the troubles in Iran.
Before concluding a contract with a government or one of its agencies
counsel should consider whether the client is sufficiently protected with respect to the following risks:
i. If the government as a contracting party requires that the applicable
law be its own, and that the mechanism for settlement of disputes be
that incorporated in its own procedural law, can the client rely upon
that law and procedure to resolve disputes fairly?
ii. If the answer to (i), above, is negative, can client bring suit in this own
country? If he does will the defendant be able to raise a defense of
sovereign immunity or lack of jurisdiction?
iii. If such a suit can be brought in client's own courts, and if the defense of
sovereign immunity is not asserted or if client's court will not accept
such a defense, will client be able to enforce a judgment in its favor?
iv. What nonlegal pressures upon the client can be exerted by the government with which the client is in contract that might nullify the client's
effort to enforce its rights?
Foreign clients other than banks (which are assiduous in their concern with
governing law and sovereign immunity) involved in the Middle East assume
that the issues raised by these questions are not issues that should concern
them. Generally these clients believe that they would in the worst case have a
remedy in the courts of the United States, which would not permit an assertion of sovereign immunity when the contract clearly concerned a commercial matter, and that having won a judgment there, that judgment would be
enforceable.
Before considering what a client might be able to do in the courts of the
United States, however, counsel should note that almost all contracts entered
into with the government of Iran or with agencies thereof were subject to the
law of Iran. The same requirement concerning governing law is true in most
other Middle Eastern countries. Furthermore, disputes about such contracts
were ordinarily required to be settled in accordance with the arbitration provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure of Iran, or by litigation in the courts of
Iran, and analogous requirements exist in other countries in the Middle East.
Neither local arbitration nor litigation was ever a very appetizing means for
settling disputes in Iran; and they are certainly unacceptable means of proceeding with a claim now. Nevertheless, counsel should note that the situation with respect to the functioning of the courts in Iran may change in the
future for the better; and then, unless it could be shown that such court
processes in Iran were sufficiently unfair to warrant holding that the legal
system in Iran is arbitrary and capricious, the client might be required to
comply with the terms of the contract and to arbitrate or litigate in Iran.
With respect to other countries in the Middle East, counsel should note
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that although they might not descend into chaos as has Iran, they might have
sufficient internal difficulties to make a swift or fair judgment in their courts
unlikely, but not enough to warrant an American court abrogating the contractual requirement of local jurisdiction and law.
Assume that a United States court would take jurisdiction over such a case;
assume further that the issues of sovereign immunity did not complicate the
proceedings, and assume still further that no unfriendly counterclaims were
maintained successfully, client and counsel should still note that the amount
of the judgment rendered would, even if the government agreed to pay it, be
subject to effective and perhaps substantial reduction by the rigorous application by the government of its fiscal laws and regulations. Counsel should
also note that with respect to many countries in the Middle East which do not
have substantial assets in the United States or in other jurisdictions where
they can be reached, the problems of jurisdiction and governing law could
present greater difficulties than has been the case with Iran.
Entering into an agreement with a government, then, should not give client
and counsel the comfortable feeling that they often had in Iran when times
were good. Governments should be viewed as different from private parties
only in so far as governments are more powerful than private parties; and it
should not be thought that governments will, inevitably, pay. The risks involved in the transaction and the difficulties with respect to enforcement are
as great, if not greater, than they are in transactions in which the client deals
with an entity or individual in the private sector.
b. Private Sector Individual or Legal Entity
With regard to contracting in the private sector in the Middle East, foreign
companies often enter into contracts without discovering precisely what the
other party to the contract puts at risk or whether that other party is able to
cover the risk that the contract requires him to run. In Iran, for example, few
clients seemed to investigate such parties in the private sector to determine
their commercial ability or their financial soundness. Almost no clients required any tangible evidence, in addition to the covenants in the contract
documents, which indicated that these private sector parties were able to
perform or to pay.
What has happened in Iran indicates that this mild and trusting approach
to identifying a private sector party's fitness to be a party to a contract is
insufficient. Many foreign companies that had contracts in Iran have now
discovered not ony that they are unable to enforce the terms of those contracts against the other parties but that they can't even locate individuals,
parties, or directors and officers of parties which were legal entities. Naturally as the turmoil in Iran has grown, the ability to communicate with one's
former customers or partners had diminished. It should be assumed that
chaos in other countries in the Middle East will result in a similar inability to
find the parties against which enforcement may be sought.
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Means to reduce this type of risk may be included in the contract, or developed prior to negotiation of the contract. First, the record of the private
sector party in the field of commerce in which it is operating can be reviewed
to determine whether or not the local party is capable of performing and, if
so, whether it has in the past. Second, the local party can be required by the
contract to provide audited financial statements, to be updated annually.
Third, guarantees can be required which will serve as a source of funds in the
event that the foreign party is sued for damages. It should be noted that it was
rare in Iran that a contract would not in some way leave the parties thereto
open to legal action by third parties; each contract had its consequential
effects, and failure to perform would result in third parties suffering damages. Fourth, substantial advance payments, coupled with a rigorous adherence by the client to a schedule of payments by the local party, can be required.
Whatever method is chosen, counsel should keep in mind that a continuous
monitoring of the local party's performance is crucial, for it will more than
likely be the client who will be severely damaged if the local party fails to
perform.
B. Scope of Work
That clause in agreements that describe the work to be done should be very
carefully drafted; the client must clearly understand what is expected, and the
local party must understand just as clearly what has been promised.
In Iran the language in contracts that described the scope of work was
often cursory, although this was less often the case in construction contracts.
Such lack of precision often led to disputes about what the client had agreed
to do; and since the client's liabilities depended upon that party's perception
of what had been promised, such lack of precision involved very large risks.
If one ensures that the scope of the work to be performed is accurately set
out, one must then go on to ensure that the client's joint venture partner, if
any, understands which aspects of the work are his duties. This can be a
particularly difficult problem since the client's ability to perform will most
often be dependent upon the prior performance of the local joint venture
partner. A classic example of this type of relationship and the manner in
which it can go wrong is provided by the situation in which a foreign construction company entered into a joint venture with an Iranian construction
company to construct a highway. Since the Iranian construction company
was not as experienced or able as the foreign company, it assumed the job of
preparing the ground for the actual construction. Unfortunately, its preparation was faulty. The foreign construction company discovered that its local
partner was unable to perform properly, and the foreign company had to do
the basic preparation again. The foreign company was held responsible by
the government for late performance of its segment of the work. The foreign
company turned to its local partner for compensation for the damage it had
suffered. The local partner argued that the foreign company had known of
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the local partner's inabilities, should have supervised the local partner more
closely, and any damages the foreign company had suffered by not doing so
were its own fault. Before this argument became absurdly circular the revolution in Iran swept away foreign company, local partner, and the concerned
officials at the ministry.
This type of problem could have been avoided by a detailed description of
responsibilities and liabilities of the local partner; by extraction from the
local partner of some tangible guarantee of his willingness to assume those
liabilities and by constant monitoring by the client of the local partner's
performance. Note that such weaknesses in these types of clauses in contracts
used throughout the Middle East are similar. Problems similar to those which
have arisen in Iran could easily arise elsewhere.

C. Control
Development of the means to control a transaction's performance, or to
allocate control for certain aspects thereof to different parties to the transaction, is important. In theory it might be best were the competent foreign
company to be in complete control. This theory carries with it, however, the
practical difficulties that a foreign company is ordinarily not able to operate
alone and efficiently inside local conditions and that a foreign company in
complete control will be required by contract to assume all liability for nonperformance. Note that in certain circumstances, however, complete control
is necessary from the outset. Companies in Iran that built nuclear reactors, or
provided complicated weapons or computer systems, were not able or willing
to give up any aspect of control over the manner in which those projects were
carried out. They consequently placed themselves voluntarily in a position in
which they assumed complete responsibility for the proper performance of
the contract, and did not seek to apportion that responsibility, and the attendance liability, among themselves, their partner or partners, and their subcontractors.
To counter the adverse effect of assuming such extensive control, and such
extensive liability, they naturally required very heavy profits. This process
was one of the principal factors that led to the remarkably high costs of some
of the projects carried out in Iran, and to their cancellation by the new government. Counsel should note that demands that the foreign party bear all of
the liability for completion of a project are common throughout the Middle
East, and almost universal in the wealthy but underdeveloped countries, with
similar effects upon the costs of performing projects in those countries.
Assuming, however, that control is to be divided between the client and the
client's partner in a joint venture, counsel should make every effort to detail
the manner of such a split in control. The liability of the two parties to the
owner of the project and to one another for whatever harm they might do in
exercising their powers in their respective areas of control should also be
defined in detail, and means to enforce that liability should be developed.
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D. Guarantees
Many guarantees are outstanding to governments and to private sector
companies in the Middle East, and it has been said that those guarantees may
amount to several billions of dollars. Since the provision of one or more types
of guarantees is common to almost all transactions that take place in the
Middle East, the use of guarantees should be understood, and the possible
means to reduce the risk inherent in providing a guarantee considered.
Guarantees provided at the close of a transaction are ordinarily of two
types: a guarantee against advanced payment, which protects the project
owner while permitting the party that is going to perform the transaction
sufficient funds to start up, and a guarantee of performance, which is ordinarily in the range of ten percent of the contract price, and which is kept in
place until a guarantee period, usually of one year after completion of the
project, has passed.
A guarantee for advance payment ordinarily carries with it little risk, in
that the amount of the guarantee is reduced as the work proceeds, and in that
the guarantor has in hand the cash equivalent of the guarantee.
A guarantee of good performance is of quite a different order of risk. This
guarantee is required to be issued by a bank, either in the form of a bank
guarantee or in the form of an irrevocable letter of credit. In either case the
amount of the guarantee is payable on demand by the guaranteed party
without any necessity that the guaranteed party take any judicial or administrative action, or state any reason, for its demand, before being able to draw
down the full amount of the guarantee.
The guaranteed party is thus able at any time to take the amount of the
guarantee, at which point the guarantor would have to bring the guaranteed
party to arbitration or litigation in accordance with the terms of the agreement, so that the tribunal could determine whether the guaranteed party's
taking of the amount of the guarantee had been warranted.
Naturally this simple device was in Iran, and continues in the rest of the
Middle East to be, excessively threatening; and there have been instances in
which guarantees were drawn down without apparent reasonable cause. On
the whole, however, guarantees of this type are generally not employed by
governments as anything more than a threat. There remains a large number
of these demand guarantees outstanding to various agencies of the government of Iran which have been continued in existence throughout the present
troubles without being drawn down. The principal problem with the existence of a guarantee of this sort is that it provides the guaranteed party with
excessive leverage upon the guarantor, and the guarantor may be unwilling to
take forceful and finite action because of the possibility of losing the guarantee. Another difficulty with this type of guarantee is that, once it is drawn
down, no assurance exists that the process of arbitration or litigation under
local law that will ensue will result in a fair or prompt determination of the
validity of the exercise of the guarantee.
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Means that can protect the client against the arbitrary exercise of such a
demand guarantee can be included in the client's agreement. First of all, if the
agreement specifies the use of an arbitral tribunal in a neutral location, the
client can reasonably expect that that arbitral tribunal will act on the basis of
the facts presented to it, and reach a just solution to the dispute that gave rise
to the exercise of the guarantee. Second, if this is not possible, and the local
party insists (as local governments ordinarily do) that the resolution of disputes be carried out in the courts or before the arbitral tribunals of the country in which the contract is to be performed, then the client can seek to insure
his risk, and pass the cost of the insurance on to the guaranteed party. Third,
client and counsel can attempt to persuade the guaranteed party that the
provision of a demand guarantee (rather than one whose payment is contingent upon the ruling of a court or arbitral panel) will operate to increase
the cost of the project, since the risk inherent in carrying out the project is
increased by the existence of the risk of loss of the guarantee. This argument
was ordinarily futile in Iran, particularly in transactions with the government.
There is however no reason not to make the argument, for in some cases the
party seeking the guarantee may bend a little; it is possible that at some point
in the future customers in the Middle East will come to understand that each
additional protection they acquire in contract must be paid for with cash,
even though the protection may never be necessary, and even though the right
to sue for damages always exists.
Guarantees may in certain circumstances be required from joint venture
partners. Although this was not a common device in Iran, it was often surprising that a foreign company doing business there would not require something more tangible from his prospective partner than a minimal investment
in a joint venture company. Naturally asking for such a guarantee carries
with it the implication that the local party may not be trustworthy, and it is a
very difficult judgment to make to determine whether one individual or
another is or is not so, and therefore should or should not be required to
produce a guarantee.
Guarantees from partners may take forms other than bank guarantees or
letters of credit. Requiring that dividends be paid into a common account for
a period of years at the beginning of a joint venture, such an account to be
operable only by joint signature, is also a form of mutual guarantee. Requiring the purchase by a partner of the product of a manufacturing facility,
or of minimum amounts of goods and services during specified time periods,
are in the nature of guarantees. And in Iran, although the device was infrequently used, and carried with it serious restraints as to the degree of share
ownership which could vest in a foreigner, bearer rather than registered
shares could be issued and placed in the possession of the foreign party; and
since bearer shares were, like banknotes, anonymous, and their physical possession carried with it the right to vote those shares and to own the dividends
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paid upon them, such possession could guarantee the conduct of the local
partner.
Whatever the device that is to be used, clients and counsel should note that
there is no completely satisfactory way to escape the necessity of providing a
guarantee in most transactions in the Middle East. Thus in the end it may be
necessary to factor the outstanding risk evidenced by the guarantee into the
cost of the work to be performed. Still whatever steps counsel can take to
avoid providing the guarantee, or to reduce the amount thereof, or to circumscribe the circumstances in which the guarantee may be called should be
urged upon the local party as alternatives to the increased costs that he will
suffer if the guarantee is in fact issued on his terms.
E. Payment
Payment clauses should encourage regularity and promptness. Certainly
the best protection that a client performing a transaction in the Middle East
can obtain is to be paid regularly. Consequently, client should require where
appropriate that payments be made as regularly and as frequently as possible
and that failure to make them will result in suspension and, after a period of
continuance of nonpayment, termination of the contract. Clients in Iran
often found themselves in the position of being paid regularly for several
months and then having a dispute arise about an invoice. They would continue work while the resolution of the dispute was under consideration.
Further invoices would be paid and then, with growing frequency, subsequent invoices would be disputed and would remain unpaid. The client would
find itself in a situation in which too much money was at risk in the disputed
invoices to make suspension or termination palatable. Thus by not requiring
payment on time, or by not enforcing such a scheme during the course of the
contract's performance, the client would lose a valuable amount of leverage.
Note that this pattern of behavior with respect to Iran was and is not peculiar
to Iran alone; similar problems have arisen in other countries in the Middle
East.
Methods to ensure payments exist. Naturally, those companies that operated in Iran and operate in the rest of the Middle East under the American
government's foreign military sales program are actually in contract with the
government of the United States and can look to that government for payment rather than to the government of the Middle Eastern country in which
they are operating. These companies are in the comfortable position of
knowing that they will most likely be paid and will, if they are not paid, be
able to employ the dispute settlement mechanisms set out in their arrangements with their government.
Clients not in a position to deal through the United States government are
occasionally able to require the entity for which they are working to establish
revolving accounts in the United States which can be drawn upon by demand
of the clients. Note, however, that these types of arrangements ordinarily
exist only in situations in which the Middle Eastern government feels that it
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would not be able to obtain what it wants unless it provides this type of
payment procedure.
A third more common method of ensuring payment is to inhibit the ability
of the payor to examine and reject invoices. In contract, this ability to examine and reject can be inhibited by inclusion of language that states that
only the payment of the disputed portion of an invoice can be rejected.
Another similar device is the use of dual billing systems, under which a client
supplying goods and services is paid for the goods pursuant to one invoice,
which is not subject to rejection and operates much like a letter of credit,
while the client is paid for services rendered upon approval of another invoice
by payor. A third device is to require that disputed amounts should be paid to
the payee, but that they will be repaid with interest to the payor in the event
that it is finally established that they are unwarranted charges.
The question of payment carries with it the requirement that the payee be
able to expatriate to his own country whatever earnings he has accrued. This
was for some years in Iran not an issue since the exchange control regulations
of the Central Bank of Iran had been suspended. Other wealthy Middle Eastern countries have similar free market attitudes towards currency trading. In
Iran, however, those controls were reimposed in November 1978 and some
foreign companies then found that they had never considered the possibility
of the reimposition of exchange controls. They were consequently in the
uncomfortable position of not being able to turn to the governmental or
private party with which they were dealing for assistance in gaining the approval required to expatriate their earnings. Note that in the case of those
companies that had thought of this matter and were dealing with private
individuals, the commitment of these individuals to assist with the acquisition of approvals was often no more than cold comfort. There was little that
such people could do when controls were reimposed. However, when an
agency of the government was the other contracting party, and had committed itself to assist in obtaining exchange control approvals should they be
required that assistance could be very valuable.
This writer has never seen an agreement in which a local contracting party
or government agency was absolutely bound to acquire necessary approvals
for the expatriation by a foreign company of its profits and assumed the
burden of any damages that the foreign company would suffer were the
requisite approvals not granted. In Iran before that country's revolutionary
troubles began, the extraction of such a commitment from the local party
never seemed necessary. However, given the freeze of Iran's assets in the
United States and the various conflicting statements by the Iranian authorities about the degree to which they will honor their obligations with respect to
outstanding loans and contracts, it will be exceedingly difficult, even should
Iran return to some normality, to extract foreign exchange from the central
banking authorities in that country.
Thus it may not be unreasonable to consider in the future when dealing
with other countries that might suffer the same economic and political tur-
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moil that has seized Iran, whether it might not be wise to require that local
contracting parties be responsible for obtaining such approvals for the expatriation of the client's profits, and be liable for damages suffered if that
approval is not forthcoming.
Concerns about payment should also extend to concerns about the currency in which payments are to be made. Ordinarily, American companies
require that payments from Middle Eastern customers be made in dollars. In
some cases, however, payment in both dollars (for the offshore portion of a
contract) and in the local currency (for the onshore portion) is required. Since
the local currencies were until the last few years pegged to the dollar or to
sterling, exchange differentials were of little concern to American companies, since currency fluctuations occurred infrequently. However, it now appears that the relationship between local Middle Eastern currencies and the
dollar are unlikely to be stabilized in the near future. It may therefore be
imperative that portions of a contract price paid in local currency be convertible into dollars at fixed rates, or that some agreement be reached concerning
the means to regularize the value of the payments to be made.
F. Liability
Two and in some cases three sources of liability exist for a client doing
business in Middle Eastern countries. In many cases the liability of client for
acts of negligence will extend to the party with which the client is in contract,
and to third parties. In other instances, if the client is involved in a joint
venture transaction, an additional source of liability will be the client's joint
venture partner.
Because the client is operating in a country which is unfamiliar, and because of the tests of negligence and the liability therefore, together with the
procedural methods of determining negligence and liability are similarly unfamiliar, counsel should ensure in the agreements into which his client enters
that the issues of liability are dealt with carefully, and that the liability is
limited as severely as possible.
In Iran it was not uncommon to find contracts which considered the primary level of liability and neglected to concern themselves with other possible
levels. Thus a contract to construct a road for the government would treat in
detail the client's liability to the government, and the limitation of that liability, but it might not have considered the possibility of claims that could be
brought by third parties. In other instances, although joint venture partners
would carefully detail their liability and the limitation thereof with regard to
the party with whom they were in contract, they would neglect to consider
their liabilities to one another or to third parties.
Foreign companies were inclined not to look beyond the assumption by
their joint venture partner of, say, half the liability for damages, to determine
whether, if it became necessary, they would be able to collect such an amount
from their partner. This is a particularly important lesson to learn from Iran,
and is immediately applicable to transactions contemplated in other coun-
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tries: the ability of anyone to reach an individual's assets in Iran, and in other
countries, is spotty at best. Iranian businessmen, like businessmen in other
countries in the Middle East, are cautious about the future. Consequently
they are inclined to spread their assets among the members of their families
and into unreachable foreign bank accounts. Thus levying upon an
individual's assets could be very difficult, for it is usually necessary throughout the Middle East to identify those assets with particularity before they can
be attached; by the time the process of identification has progressed to the
point where action can be taken, the assets will ordinarily have been removed,
transferred or liquidated. Naturally when chaos of the degree that has seized
Iran occurs, seeking to attach assets within the country is for all purposes
impossible, and the claimant must look overseas. The experience with Iran
indicates that although the government of Iran may have substantial assets
overseas, individuals have been able to disperse and camouflage their assets
sufficiently swiftly to foil attempts by those individuals' creditors and claimants to satisfy their claims.
It is thus not sufficient to rely upon the language of a contract to ensure
that one's local partner's assets will be as available for levy and collection as
will one's own. Furthermore, one should note once again that contracts between joint venturers and the party or agency requiring the work to be done
ordinarily require that both joint venturers by severely liable for damages
caused by either partner. Naturally the party or agency seeking damages will
choose as a target the larger and more substantial foreign company. That
company should consequently be in a position to claim over against its
partner.
G. Force Majeure
Force majeure clauses ordinarily appeared in all contracts for the provision
of services in Iran; but were less commonly found in joint venture agreements, financing documents, and other types of agreements providing for the
assumption of prospective rights and duties rather than for the performance
of tangible activities. Wherever such clauses appeared, however, they were
usually of the, catch-all standard variety that left much to interpretation
during the last six months of 1978, when the revolution in Iran was gaining
strength. When those clauses were not in contracts, the results during that
period were possible to determine only by agreement of the parties. Now it
appears that even the possibility of negotiating agreement about these issues
has disappeared.
The effect of an insufficient force majeure clause is exemplified by the
trials of a foreign company engaged in an aerial survey of certain remote
parts of Iran which found its camp and airfield under attack by local villagers, who didn't like foreigners or airplanes either. After the attack, the
government sent gendarmerie contingent informed the foreigners that it
would be unlikely that he would be able to protect them, but the government
agency with which the foreign company was in contract said that the
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gendarmerie's protection was adequate and that if the survey was suspended,
the government would consider the foreign company in breach. Confronted
with this confusing situation and with the general language of the force majeure clause, the foreign company kept its people in place until the threat of
further attacks upon personnel and the company's property became intolerable. At that point the personnel took their equipment and, literally, flew. But
whether an incident of force majeure existed which suspended the foreign
company's duty to perform has yet to be finally determined.
The problem with the force majeure clause in that agreement was that it
was not specific enough to be applicable in different types of situations. In
particular that force majeure clause, like almost all the others that are in use
in the Middle East, failed to provide the foreign company with the complete
authority to decide when its personnel were in physical jeopardy. If a
company's employees are stoned one day, but not stoned for the next three
days, the foreign company has little basis for declaring that force majeure
exists and that withdrawal of the personnel will not result in a breach of
contract. In like manner, although a few cases of cholera may not constitute
an "epidemic" in generalized contractual terms, one's employees may not
perceive the distinction.
The solution to this problem is to consider and include in the relevant
agreement different responses to different situations. Naturally the foreign
employer's decision should be determinative in the case of the physical wellbeing of his employees and although such power of the employer was to this
writer's knowledge not written into any contract concluded in Iran or elsewhere in the Middle East, it would seem natural that it should have been.
With regard to other possible incidents of force majeure, however, further
definition of what constitutes such an incident of force majeure should be
developed. Thus if the customs service goes on strike, and the strike continues
for a length of time prescribed in the contract, that should be deemed an
incident of force majeure.
Most counsel face a problem of tact when dealing with this issue, for incidents of force majeure resolve themselves into two general categories: those
that are truly acts of God, and those that are the product of man's folly.
Dealing with the first category is somewhat simpler, although still more demanding, than dealing with the latter. For with regard to the latter category,
it is necessary to bring up issues such as revolution, civil disorder, strikes, and
the like that may not be subjects that one's local interlocutor, particularly if
he is a civil servant, will want to discuss. More often than not, in tranquil
times in Middle Eastern countries, the whole issue is brushed aside as completely hypothetical, and more often than not counsel leaves the matter at
that.
II. Settlement of Disputes
Settlement of disputes language in an agreement should be handled in a
manner which will if the local law permits allow a neutral forum and a neutral
law to be chosen for the settlement process. In some countries in the Middle
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East this is not possible: local settlement boards or courts must be used, and
no other options will be considered. In Iran, the options existed with respect
to contracting; in the private sector, but less frequently with respect to contracting with the government of Iran although it should be noted that banks,
when lending money to the government of Iran, required the use not only of
the law of their own jurisdicitons, but the use of their own courts for enforcement, and they were granted those rights. In general, however, the government required that disputes be settled either by arbitration or by litigation
under the law of Iran. Other Middle Eastern governments are similarly protective of themselves and require local adjudication or arbitration, and the
application of local law.
Counsel should make every effort to have arbitration be the disputes settlement mechanism and to have that arbitration take place offshore, even
though it may be difficult, if not impossible, to achieve this. To go offshore is
without question the best method available to be bogged down in arbitration
in a Middle Eastern country, or to have to go to court there, has two main
difficulties: the process in both cases is slow, and in arbitration under local
law it is almost certain that all the arbitrators, or at least the third arbitrator,
will be locals.
Counsel should note when preparing agreements that a covenant to employ
local law and jurisdiction may at some time in the future, in a time when
chaos in a country becomes as complete as it has in Iran, have to be attacked
in court in the United States, and an attempt will then have to be made to
persuade that court that the plaintiff's contractual agreement to local jurisdiction and law should not be honored, given the patent impossibility of
obtaining ordinary due process. Although such an argument may seem, with
respect to Iran, an easy one to make, that argument may not be quite so
strong were order to be restored in Iran in the near future. In addition, not all
countries which suffer turmoil may suffer it to the degree that Iran has, and a
court in the United States may be reluctant to reject a clear commitment to a
foreign jurisdiction and to foreign law, unless the situation is, like that in
Iran, such that no other course of action will permit the plaintiff due process.
A. Governing Law and Governing Language
Usually the governing law in agreements in Middle Eastern countries is the
local law. In Iran, this was not required by law, and the law of a neutral
territory could be used. Indeed, even the law of the client's own jurisdiction
could be used although there was some dispute in the legal community in Iran
as to whether such a choice of law was proper. Although application of
foreign law and foreign jurisdiction was possible in Iran, and is possible in
other countries in the Middle East, counsel should note that local governments will ordinarily demand the application of their own law to contracts
into which they enter.
Little in the law of Iran with respect to contracts was objectionable, and
this is generally true of the law of contracts in countries with an Islamic legal
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heritage, for the reason that that traditional system of law provides generally
that contracts between parties will operate in accordance with their terms
unless they are in derogation of some basic principal of Islamic law.
The most serious problem today with the application of the law of Iran to a
contract appears to be that the definition of what is in derogation of basic
principles in Iran has altered since the Shah's reign ended. Certain types of
contracts entered into prior to the change in regime may not be honored, but
these will most probably be those that are at odds with Islamic principles.
Note should be taken of this flexibility of contract law in the Middle East.
Other Middle Eastern countries, seeing the chaos in Iran, are becoming
quickly more circumspect in the degree to which they will permit activities
which are publicly perceived to be un-"Islamic"; and that tightening of attitudes towards things western will undoubtedly have an effect upon commercial transactions throughout the Middle East..
In general, then, although it would be best, given the possibility of turmoil
in countries in the Middle East in the future, were one able to have the law of a
foreign jurisdiction apply to contracts involving countries which exhibit the
same symptoms as the government, economy and society of Iran did three
years ago, that is not always possible; in any case, the application of the law
of any country of Islamic legal tradition will at the least seem familiar to
western attorneys with respect both to substance and to process, unless, of
course, the country in question is in the throes of revolution.
With regard to governing language, some small but potentially rigorous
difficulties exist. Again, contracts concluded in the Middle East are sometimes required to be governed by the local language text, and sometimes by
the English text. Occasionally no language text is supplied. Whatever the
case, there is a tendency for the documentation produced in the course of the
transaction's performance to be written in bad English or in the local language. This could naturally cause tremendous problems if disputes arise since
the English would have to be translated into the local language were resort
had to the local mechanisms of disputes settlement, and the local langauge
would have to be translated into English if the mechanism used to settle a
dispute were litigation in the United States or arbitration before a neutral
body. The point here is that if possible English should be chosen as the governing language, and it should certainly be the language of communication
between the parties.
1.

SUSPENSION AND TERMINATION

Contract language concerning suspension and termination should set out
in detail the situations which will give rise to either suspension or termination,
and should define the effects of either such action. No amount of time is too
great to spend on hammering out the details of this language. Some companies that did work in Iran are still unable to assume that they have effectively
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terminated or suspended their operations there, and it is clear that some of
these companies' employees, who refuse to be dismissed, consider that their
foreign employers are still in operation in Iran.
Generally in contract in the Middle East the grounds for suspension and
termination were defined as the failure to perform or the failure to pay.
Counsel should consider detailing the circumstances within these broad categories which would permit suspension and termination. Will suspension or
termination be arbitral if it occurs because of nonpayment? Will a demand
guarantee be exercisable in such a situation? Does the foreign party have the
right to withdraw his employees and remove his equipment? If the foreign
party is suspending or terminating a joint venture partner, does the foreign
party have the right or the duty to continue the project? What changes of
circumstances will constitute a basis for suspension or termination?
All of these questions, among others, should be considered and answered
in the agreement. The text should not be left like that of a loan agreement
entered into by a major bank which provided that the loan would become
immediately due and payable in the event of a substantial change in the
economic position of the Borrower, the Borrower in this case being the government of Iran. Precision is to be sought; generality will leave the foreign
party with many uncomfortable questions should it decide to suspend or
terminate.
2.

OPINIONS OF LOCAL COUNSEL

An opinion, or opinions, should be sought from local counsel about the
legal validity of agreements, or segments of agreements. These opinions will
not operate as "insurance" because it is unlikely that a foreign company
would be able to sue a local attorney for negligence, even though such a suit
might be warranted. Such an opinion will however operate to encourage the
local counsel to be circumspect with regard to matters that trouble him, and
should therefore assist in informing counsel about problems that may have
escaped his notice.
More than one opinion can be requested from local counsel, and it is advisable to require local counsel to provide such an opinion with respect to each
area of the law, or problem within an area, that concerns counsel. A final
opinion should also be had from local counsel to the effect that the documents signed are enforceable in accordance with their terms, and that local
counsel knows of no law that Would render any term or condition thereof null
and void.
The same type of opinion should be requested from one's local accountants with respect to tax and other fiscal matters. This opinion will be of value
for the same reasons local counsel's opinion is valuable; and for the further
reason that it will, if the client is led astray by it, form the basis of a claim that
could be pursued against the accounting firm. Accounting firms that are in
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operation in the Middle East are ordinarily firms that are part of worldwide
accounting firms.
Conclusions
In light of what has happened so quickly in Iran, counsel should when
contemplating structuring a transaction in the Middle East, perceive that the
documents that he must prepare should be more detailed and flexible than
those he might ordinarily employ. He should also be aware that he will not be
able to gain all the protections suggested in this paper; that he will have to
choose among them, trading away some in order to receive others. Thus the
balancing of one protection against another will be of crucial importance. It
will be of little use if client receives a bank guarantee if that guarantee is
subject to the laws of the country in which it is issued, and no practical
method exists to enforce the guarantee. The process of trading one protection
for another, and of constructing documents that provide the client with clear
and enforceable protections, is a difficult one, complicated in the Middle
East by linguistic and cultural differences that are seldom noticed and almost
never bridged. Thus counsel should exert himself more than he usually might,
and more than he often did in Iran, to dissect the transaction so that the risks
involved will be revealed and then exert himself again to determine, and to
provide in the contract documents, an appropriate mix of protections for his
client.

